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A B S T R A C T
The 2013 Snowden revelations ignited a vehement debate on the legitimacy and breadth of intelligence
operations that monitor the Internet and telecommunications worldwide. The ongoing invasion of the private
sphere of individuals around the world by governments and companies is an issue that is handled inadequately
using current technological and organizational measures.
This article1 argues that in order to retain a vital and vibrant Internet, its basic infrastructure needs to be
strengthened considerably. We propose a number of technical and political options, which would contribute to
improving the security of the Internet. It focuses on the debates around end-to-end encryption and
anonymization, as well as on policies addressing software and hardware vulnerabilities and weaknesses of
the Internet architecture.
1. Introduction
The discussion about the legitimate balance between national
security and information privacy, particularly concerning electronic –
or digital – communication of all kinds, has been going on for several
years. Intensiﬁed by the Snowden leaks, this discussion was also a topic
of debate in various national parliaments and the European
Parliament. This was the case, as the published information indicated
that surveillance practices were used that infringe upon the basic civil
liberties of (both US and non-US) citizens and the national sovereignty
of states.
We argue that the debate on mass surveillance has highlighted the
need to improve the security of the Internet, by paying attention to
policies that help to i) stimulate the adoption of Privacy-Enhancing
Technologies (PETs), ii) address software and hardware vulnerabilities
and weaknesses of the Internet architecture/backbone and iii) devise
industry incentives, in order to give consumers and organisations more
choice about which products to adopt.
Recent developments and discussions, both in the US and the EU,
indicate that governments are reluctant to adopt such policies, despite
the recommendations of security experts and civil rights activists. This
illustrates several scenarios and lists several promising technical means
for providing more privacy and security to citizens.
2. The post-Snowden world has laid vulnerabilities bare
The Snowden ﬁles revealed the existence of a large-scale surveil-
lance program carried out by the US National Security Agency (NSA)
and its intelligence partners in the “Five Eyes” Network.2 Massive
amounts of data have been collected under this program, which was set
up with the objective of protecting the national security of the involved
countries. This data collection was achieved through the exploitation of
vulnerable Internet protocols, software and hardware and the use of a
plethora of highly sophisticated and cutting-edge software and hard-
ware tools3 available to the intelligence agencies, as well as through
more traditional practices like coercion or physical wiretapping.
In a similar manner, businesses all over the world are gathering
consumer-related electronic data and analysing it to ﬁnd clues that help
increase customer experience and proﬁtability.
Most of the data gathered by these organisations is so-called
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.csi.2016.09.011
Received 31 March 2016; Received in revised form 23 September 2016; Accepted 25 September 2016
⁎ Corresponding author.
E-mail addresses: Stefan.Schuster@tecnalia.com (S. Schuster), meberg@capgemini.com (M. van den Berg), Xabier.Larrucea@tecnalia.com (X. Larrucea),
ton.slewe@capgemini.com (T. Slewe), peter.ide-kostic@europarl.europa.eu (P. Ide-Kostic).
1 This article is based on research carried out at the request of the Science and Technology Option Assessment Panel (STOA) and the Committee for Civil Liberties, Justice and Home
Aﬀairs (LIBE) of the European Parliament [11,9]. Its scope is therefore primarily European, however its implications are assumed to be generally applicable.
2 U.K., Canada, New Zealand, and Australia.
3 Documented in the so-called ANT catalogue that has been published on WikiLeaks.
Computer Standards & Interfaces 50 (2017) 76–82
0920-5489/ © 2016 The Author(s). Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the  CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
Available online 28 September 2016
crossmark
metadata. Metadata is “data about data” and describes the attributes of
data content or communication. These attributes may, for instance,
specify the author, the length or the type of data content. It may also
specify the sender, receiver, time, date, duration and channel of data
communication.
Despite the fact that metadata, by deﬁnition, does not contain the
content of a message, its combination and analysis can reveal an
extraordinary amount of information. The application of novel data
fusion, analysis and processing techniques that work on large amounts
of structured and unstructured data from diﬀerent sources, commonly
called Big Data Analytics, allows to identify patterns and relations, and
to draw conclusions about very intimate details on people's habits and
associations. Studies [1,2] show that sometimes only a few data points
are needed to accurately identify individuals by applying this kind of
analysis on anonymized or pseudonymized data. The larger and more
diversiﬁed the underlying dataset is, the more precise big data analysis
is becoming.
The ability of deriving personal details from all obtained commu-
nication metadata, not to mention snooping on the actual content of
messages or private data, is raising severe concerns of privacy
advocates, civil rights activists, politicians, technologists and citizens.
It is considered to violate the fundamental right to privacy. Citizens
lack control over what happens with their data and who has access to it
and, more often than not, are not even aware that they are being
observed. In light of the evolution of the Internet of Things (IoT) and
the way our environment is becoming increasingly ‘smart’, privacy
invasion has truly reached Orwellian dimensions. Smart home appli-
ances, telecare, autonomous cars, and of course smartphones are
already available today. These generate massive amounts of data that
is related to the human beings operating or using these environments.
Most of this information and associated metadata is not adequately
secured against unauthorized access or modiﬁcation.
Data protection laws exist in most western countries, but they are
largely limited to regulating the treatment of “personal data”, which
includes names, addresses, identiﬁcation numbers, biometric informa-
tion and any information that directly or uniquely identiﬁes a person.
The existing mechanisms for enforcing these regulations are, however,
insuﬃcient in the majority of cases [3,4]. This is because they are
limited to ex-post sanctions, but do not provide means to prevent data
privacy violations from the outset. For a number of online services,
data privacy settings cannot be deﬁned by end users, but are pre-set. In
cases in which users can inﬂuence these settings, their default conﬁg-
uration is often based on an opt-out instead of an opt-in principle.
Options for disallowing the transmission of personal data to third
parties for commercial purposes are not available in most services that
are based on business models that rely on user-data for generating
revenue.
Three relevant stakeholder groups can be identiﬁed in the context
of the discussion addressing online privacy and mass surveillance: i)
state agencies and law enforcement authorities (LEA), ii) the busi-
nesses world (i.e. B2C), and iii) citizens. Each of these groups has
diﬀerent interest, can conﬂict with each other at times. Security
agencies and LEA argue that privacy is secondary to national security.
Businesses build on the prospects of developing services supported by
IoT technologies and of customizing their oﬀering to meet the
individual needs of consumers in niche markets. Citizens want to enjoy
the beneﬁts of online and customized services, smart spaces, telecare,
autonomous cars and other technology based advances. Some are
willing to sacriﬁce part of their privacy, while others defend the
preservation of their privacy vehemently. This is a generational
phenomenon, with the digitally native generation apparently being
more inclined to surrender some of their privacy than older generations
[5]. Even when users are concerned about their privacy, they value it
very low in monetary terms. Many users are willing to give away
personal data for a small price and would pay even less for increased
protection of their privacy. This underlines the need for regulations and
policies that make the value of private data more explicit and
transparent to the users. This way, users will be able to make better
informed and qualiﬁed decisions with respect to ceding part of their
privacy in online transactions [6–8].
From a societal perspective it is important to maintain an adequate
balance between security interests and citizens' privacy and basic civil
rights. The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
(ICCPR) – as part of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
(UDHR) and ratiﬁed by all democratic states – establishes the right to
democratic governance, the right to intellectual freedom, and the right
to moral equality. These human rights, together with the principle of
separation of executive, legislative and judiciary powers, form the basic
pillars of democratic societies. The imbalance between security and
privacy that has been created by the described mass surveillance
practices and the intrusion of the privacy sphere by means of data
analysis, clearly compromises the right to intellectual freedom and, as
such, compromises one of the pillars of democratic societies.
For this reason adequate levels of privacy must be guaranteed both
in real life, as well as in the digital world. The means to achieve this
balance need to be established on both the political and on the
technical level.
2.1. Research approach
In 2014, the Science and Technology Option Assessment Panel
(STOA) and the Committee for Civil Liberties, Justice and Home
Aﬀairs (LIBE) of the European Parliament requested the elaboration of
a two-part study [9] aiming to verify and conﬁrm published evidence
and information on the practice of mass surveillance by nation state
agencies. Due to the delicate and sensitive nature of the general topic
and the speciﬁc questions at hand, the methodology used was desktop
research for comparing the coherence and consistence of the informa-
tion from various sources. This information was then reﬂected on,
adapted and in some cases extended through a number of interviews
with and reviews by a panel of thirty-ﬁve internationally renowned
subject matter experts. This article summarizes these ﬁndings in a
concise way, focusing on elaborating the diﬀerent policy options
available, while elaborating on developments in law-enforcements in
the past few years.
3. Possible scenarios to counter mass surveillance
Based on the ﬁndings of the study described in Section 2.1, this
study recommends a number of short-to-mid-term technical and mid-
to-long-term policy options for protecting the privacy and conﬁdenti-
ality of data and communications of (European) citizens. In structuring
these options, two dimensions were deemed the most exclusive, in the
sense that there was no direct, apparent correlation between the two:
level of innovation and level of public intervention. The options in the
level of innovation range from promoting the use of existing technol-
ogies (or making them more user-friendly) to constructing a complete
new technological world and many things in between. In IT terms, the
options are either to patch the current world in order to optimize what
is already there or to deliver an entirely new update, substantially
mitigating risks. With regards to the level of public intervention, the
options range from promoting good practices and ﬁnancing worthwhile
initiative, to regulating industries and/or instituting new institutions.
When these dimensions are plotted opposite one another, four
scenarios emerge. The quadrants depicted in Fig. 1 cover these
scenarios, which have been termed i) ‘Promote adoption’ ii) ‘Build
conﬁdence’ iii) ‘Disrupt’ and iv) ‘Innovate’.
The scenario calling for ‘promote adoption’ of readily available
technologies, methods, concepts and models covers the most easily
implementable measures for generating short-term impact. The wide
scale adoption of the ‘security-by-design’ principle in software and
hardware development and network administration is one of the
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recommendations in this context. Together with the demand for a
reinforced regionalised IT service industry, this is capable of competing
with today's major ISPs and Cloud service providers, of which the
headquarters are mostly based in the US.
The motivation behind the policy recommendation of “promoting
open protocols, open implementations [and] open systems” is the idea
of enabling public scrutiny that allows for validation and veriﬁcation of
software and service functionality by analysing their design and
implementation. This recommendation does not imply Open Source
Software (OSS) and systems to be less error prone or even more secure
than proprietary software and systems, but is based on the public
accessibility of its sources. The related recommendation to “initiate a
European ‘OSS Bug Bounty Program’ or ﬁnance existing programs”,
is a measure that would directly contribute to and foster the idea of
community-driven code inspections.
The foremost short-term technical option recommended for ensur-
ing data security and privacy is encryption. A consistent and suﬃciently
strong encryption of both, the transmitted data (content) and the
transmission channel guarantees a secure data exchange between two
endpoints, also called end-to-end encryption (E2EE). Regulations that
require applications to adopt E2EE and maximum privacy settings as
default would help in stimulating a widespread adoption of crypto-
graphic technologies. Although most service providers nowadays do
encrypt messages during transfer, some encrypt them on their servers,
through which they are owners of the encryption keys. This cannot be
considered E2EE, since the very provider could act as a ‘man in the
middle’ and decrypt data without the consent of its owner [10].
Secondly, the ‘build conﬁdence’ approach includes measures to
improve trust between countries without the use of disruptive changes
in technology. This mainly implies regulating existing technologies.
Deploying security baseline regulations in order to ensure a minimum
level of security measures for critical information infrastructure
elements would facilitate the establishment of liability schemes and
according sanctions for companies whose products or services do not
comply with such baselines. Another way in which building conﬁdence
can be done is by implementing in a more widespread manner so-called
coordinated vulnerability disclosure, i.e. the decriminalization and
incorporation into corporate workﬂows of responsibly discovering
and disclosing security ﬂaws.
The ‘disrupt’’ scenario explores protectionist approaches, such as
isolating a European Internet subnet or establishing territorially
limited certiﬁcation schemes. Both endanger and ignore the global
character of the Internet. The scenario proposes a number of further-
reaching measures, including certiﬁcation schemes on an international
level, and the option of instituting diﬀerent subdomains – sometimes
negatively referred to as the ‘Balkanization’ of the internet. However,
this option in itself is questionable due to its limitative nature and the
costs and expertise involved.
The options laid out in the ‘innovate’ quadrant cover the advance-
ment of vulnerability detection, tracking and tracing technologies, the
improvement of protocols and so-called data-centric security concepts4
through further development, fostered by an increased research and
development funding. These possible developments are concerned with
stimulating research and development into reduced traceability of data
and devices and detection of surveillance. This would imply developing
technology explicitly aimed at making large-scale tracking of users
impossible. Another possible innovation is aimed at improving (cur-
rent) insecure protocols and insecure architecture elements, or alter-
natively depreciating inherently insecure protocols. The ﬁnal option is
aimed at focusing on data-centric security, especially on implementa-
tion concepts and more speciﬁcally those for individual users.
The discussions in the past years have focused on three main areas
for improving privacy and security for end-users. These are related to i)
stimulating the widespread adoption of Privacy-Enhancing
Technologies (PETs), ii) addressing hardware and software vulnerabil-
ities and broken Internet protocols, and iii) strengthening the capacity
of the IT security industry.
4. Policies stimulating adoption of PETs, including E2EE and
anonymization tools (Tor, Funding of OS)
A ﬁeld of research that has received a considerably increased
amount of attention since the Snowden revelations is the ﬁeld of the
so-called Privacy-Enhancing Technologies (PETs). This grab-bag term
refers to technologies that allow users to protect their data privacy
while using (online) services or applications. One of the proposed
short-term options considered is the widespread adoption of end-to-
end encryption (E2EE).
E2EE is the technical option that has been identiﬁed in a number of
studies and reports [11], as well as by experts on the subject, as the
principal and most secure technical manner of protecting privacy and
security of electronic information and communication. Obviously, this
only refers to encryption that is implemented correctly: when there is
no legal restriction regarding the power of the encryption used, end-
points are secured and communications are not subject to any ‘man-in-
the-middle’ attacks. Legislation should forbid the use of generic back-
doors for LEA purposes and the trading of zero-day exploits.
When E2EE messages are encrypted on the sender's device and
decrypted on the recipient's device, telecom providers, ISPs and service
providers such as Google, Facebook, Tencent or Microsoft only see
encrypted information. Thus, these companies cannot disclose (read-
able) copies to government agencies, even with a court order. E2EE
makes potential interceptions of communications detectable. In this
way, E2EE oﬀers an improved level of conﬁdentiality of information
and, thus, of privacy by protecting users from censorship, repression
and unwarranted interceptions by law enforcement and intelligence
agencies. However, as no guarantees on the safety of encryption exist, a
clearer deﬁnition of what companies can promise under the guise of
encryption and what can be expected of them is necessary. Some forms
of regulation regarding this, such as oﬃcial labelling agreements, can
be expected in the coming years.
Encryption has taken centre stage in discussions on what law
enforcement should be able to see. Information on ﬁnancial transac-
tions is clearly crucial in identifying ﬁnancial streams, and therefore
LEA would hardly be able to obtain any investigation data from
vendors or service providers that apply E2EE. Another way in which
encryption hinders legitimate concerns is the fact that companies have
a right (within reasonable bounds) to monitor employees' behaviour.
Overall however, opportunities for monitoring individuals and larger
Fig. 1. Quadrant of policy option scenarios recommended in study on mass surveillance
[9].
4 Data-centric security, sometimes also referred to as de-perimeterisation [31,32],
enables location independent data security through a combination of context-based
access control, encryption and the usage of secure protocols.
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groups abound, so the fear of LEA ‘going dark’ and not being able to see
what happens in the world seems to be slightly oversold to the public
[12]. Strong cryptographic software is available to those who want to
use it, as E2EE software has existed since the 1980s. Such software
includes PGP (e-mail encryption software released in 1991), OTR (‘Oﬀ
the Record’, for secure instant messaging), Internet telephony apps like
SilentPhone, Signal, or DIME (aka Dark Mail) and speciﬁc plug-ins for
Chrome, Firefox and other browsers. Newer E2EE tools do not only
encrypt data, but also encrypt metadata (e.g. DIME and ProtonMail)
[13,14].
The integration of encryption with existing functionalities, such as
web browsing, creates new applications every day. The introduction of
Let's Encrypt in 2015 [15], marks the ﬁrst time that the certiﬁcates
used in encryption protocols were available for free. The proclaimed
aim of Let's Encrypt was to make encryption the default for all web
connections.
For various reasons (technical, social, psychological, political),
adoption of E2EE is not obvious for most users. The lack of user-
friendliness is certainly not the only reason why users do not imple-
ment E2EE. Increasing the adoption of E2EE can follow two roads:
stimulating individual users and stimulating collective solutions.
Considering the many barriers that individuals face, it is advisable to
raise awareness, improve knowledge, carry out testing and provide
other help with ﬁnding the right tools.
On the other hand, collective options are much more promising in
terms of reaching economies of scale. The public reaction to mass
surveillance practices revealed by Snowden has already led to market
dynamics that forced a number of service providers (such as Google,
Apple, Amazon, Facebook, Twitter and LinkedIn) to deploy E2EE
services. Such default settings could, however, impact the business
models of these companies. In order to sustain and foster these market
dynamics, regulation that mandates default security and privacy
features and settings in hardware and software solutions should be
considered. In order to guarantee users access and consent to
information on which of their data is being used, some additional
forms of regulation could also be developed.
Besides encryption, other promising manners of providing im-
proved privacy are anonymizing services, like the Tor, i2p or GNUnet
networks and secure services for logging in remotely, for example
virtual private networks (VPN) and similar services. These are able to
hide some of the most sensitive metadata elements such as time,
duration, or endpoint addresses.
Anonymizing services act as a ‘man in the middle’5 while browsing
the Web. They handle communications between the device and the
website that is being visited anonymously. If everything is conﬁgured
well and works correctly, the target website only sees information from
the anonymizing service, so it cannot identify the user's IP address or
other personal information [16]. This prevents third parties from
identifying the endpoints of such communications and enables access
to otherwise blocked or censored websites. Generally, anonymizing
services make it possible for users to surf the Internet anonymously
and without being observed. Without anonymization, the website that
is visited, the Internet service provider (ISP), or any eavesdropper on
the Internet connection can determine which websites the user of a
speciﬁc device visits. Moreover, other personal data can also be
accessed likewise [17].
Most anonymizing technologies still have considerable issues with
usability, in the sense that they require eﬀort on the users' part
(separate installation and some amount of knowledge) and produce
noticeable delay. In the case of Tor, this issue has been addressed by
developing the Tor Browser to a certain extent.
Furthermore, a number of possible attack strategies against the Tor
network have demonstrated the possibility of identifying the IP
addresses of Tor users, as documented on the Tor project's blog [18].
Although such attacks are highly complex and require a fair amount of
technical and ﬁnancial capability not readily available to everyone, they
demonstrate the impossibility of establishing absolute levels of anon-
ymity. Some of the documents revealed by Snowden also conﬁrm the
technical ability of state agencies in compromising seemingly secure
VPNs.
Encouraging the development of fast, high-quality TOR-like net-
work(s) with many entry points and exit points on a national or
regional level appears to be a desirable development. Some regulation
could stimulate research and development, as well the commercializa-
tion of such services. For instance, Facebook in the US has already
facilitated the integration of TOR as a way to access its services in a
privacy-friendly way [19].
A lot of work on PETs remains to be done. The industry is in its
infancy in relation to patenting and standardization. Moreover usabil-
ity remains a challenge. Nevertheless, PETs are currently the most
promising short-term approach for protecting privacy.
5. Policies addressing software and hardware vulnerabilities
and the Internet architecture/backbone
Vulnerabilities in hardware and software have always been the
Achilles' heel of information systems. Preventing these vulnerabilities
would considerably contribute to an increased level of security. Despite
eﬀorts in the ﬁeld of quality assurance, most hardware and software
products and services still include many vulnerabilities that can be
exploited. Mostly, security measures are added later, instead of
including security in the design from the very start, as is promoted
by the “security-by-design” paradigm [20]. Taking malicious practices
into account during the design phase can not only prevent vulnerabil-
ities, but can also reduce their impact. Supporting certiﬁcation
schemes, coordinated disclosure policies and funding of development
and implementation of open source software are the leading ways
forward in designing policies for addressing hardware and software
vulnerabilities. These fall mainly within the ‘Promote Adoption’ and
‘Build Conﬁdence’ scenarios mentioned earlier: these are relatively low-
hanging fruit and are, in fact, already starting to be implemented
within Europe.
Secure design relies on secure open standards and protocols.
However, many protocols in use today should be considered insecure
(e.g. DNS, BGP) [21,22] and are in dire need of repair. Implementing
ﬁxes will take a lot of time. In the meantime, consumers are left
vulnerable to attacks by states and criminals. Additionally, insecure
protocols remain in use while secure variants are available.
The veriﬁcation and certiﬁcation of the design and implementation
of open standards, protocols and hardware and software solutions by
globally trusted (independent) organizations is a prerequisite for
addressing the problems mentioned above. Setting up regional certi-
ﬁcation bodies around the world could remedy the potential lack of
trust in organizations that have acquired a bad reputation for conspir-
ing with intelligence agencies to weaken PETs. The call for openness of
systems is not to be confused with licensing schemes or intellectual
property rights. It is based on the idea that open systems can be
scrutinized by the community, whereas closed proprietary systems
require the user to blindly trust in them without being able to validate
and verify their trustworthiness. This does not imply that open source
code is automatically better than proprietary code. Evidently, bad code
is bad code. Initiatives to standardize the review and veriﬁcation of
coding are expected to take oﬀ in coming years and could receive more
governmental funding. Using open source applications in publicly-
funded institutions seems like an obvious way to expand their use and
acceptability. Regulations that enable the coordinated disclosure6 of
5 This obviously implies a level of trust of the user in the company oﬀering the service. 6 Sometimes also called responsible disclosure.
S. Schuster et al. Computer Standards & Interfaces 50 (2017) 76–82
79
vulnerabilities are considered another important instrument that
would help reporting and ﬁxing ﬂaws in a timely and controlled
manner. Actually, in many countries and organizations the disclosure
of vulnerabilities is still regarded to be an oﬀense, either against the
national security or trade secrets. In such cases, the reporting party
may be sued. This situation contributes to sustaining a black market for
vulnerabilities and developing new attack vectors. A well-designed
coordinated-disclosure policy stimulates those who report to disclose
vulnerabilities. Rewarding and recognizing reporters for their work
enables organizations to ﬁx vulnerabilities and reduces the workload of
law enforcement. The rewards for reporters have enabled the develop-
ment of a new business model, connecting reporters and organizations.
Secure design and implementation is essential for open source
software. Most users use open source software in daily life, but too little
eﬀort and funding is spent on the security of this software. More funds
could be provided for this, as well as for independent evaluation. A
good example of a provision of such funds is the 2015 initiative by the
Dutch government to grant €500.000 to OpenSSL, an open-source
encryption software library that is used around the world [23]. Since it
is nearly impossible to guarantee the security of the whole supply
chain, some academics have argued that a possible alternative could be
to stimulate research to design resilient software architecture, oﬀering
secure products and services on top of potentially insecure hardware
components.
6. Industry incentives to improve security
In the past few years, several countries began setting up separate
Internet infrastructure services in order to provide a higher level of
security. Russia has professed a desire to be able to ‘draw up the bridge’
and is providing localized services. There are several reasons for larger
countries or regions (such as the EU) to pursue an amount of
independence. First of all, increasing independence helps to improve
adherence to a country/region's own security standards and, most
importantly, legislation. Furthermore, regionalization makes sense, as
it can promote the development of nationalized IT capabilities. In
recent years, the idea of security as a business enabler has become
fashionable, although its eﬀects remain to be seen more clearly,
especially on the consumer side.
Technologically, there are no great impediments to developing
nationalized or regionalized services. In fact, in earlier decades, many
examples of nationally-oriented social media, search engines, operating
systems and other services abounded. Due to market concentration, a
few giant (US) corporations – such as Google, Facebook and Apple –
now control most of this landscape. Yet, these services were never
developed with the security of their users in mind. They also do not
have any speciﬁc legislation attached to protect users against spying.
Such services mainly comply with US law, but hardly take local
legislation into account. Therefore, the market for software is still
mainly focused on the US and the market for hardware is centralized in
Southeast Asia. As it is nearly impossible to guarantee the security of
the whole supply chain, more hardware components could be designed
and manufactured on a regional level, under a stricter legislation.
Taking the example of the European Union: despite the sustained
growth of the IT sector worldwide, the overall IT market revenue of
Europe in comparison with the rest of the world has been steadily
declining since 2005. This situation is expected to continue as a recent
IT market report of IDC/EITO3 [24] predicts a growth rate of 2,7% for
the US ICT market in 2016, while it estimates the European IT market
to grow only between 0,8% and 0,9% in the same period.
The idea of developing IT capabilities that are regionally oriented
and focussed on enabling businesses received a boost after the 2015
European Court decision that invalidated the free exchange of data
between the EU and the US.7 It is becoming increasingly clear for
businesses that in order to do business in regional markets, they need
to adhere to the playing ﬁeld there.
The eﬀects of the knowledge of mass surveillance on consumer
behaviour are also still unclear. Although a lot of industry initiatives
have been developed, few ‘safe’ alternatives do exist. The 2014 launch
of the Signal app, as an alternative to Facebook-owned Whatsapp, has
seen signiﬁcant use and is used as an encrypted SMS-like service.
In order to strengthen regionalized initiatives, investment by
governments is necessary. Structural diﬀerentiators in this ﬁeld are
usually described in terms of the availability of qualiﬁed professionals
and regulatory ﬂexibility. Up to this point, a demand for secure
products does not rank highly within industry development and
customer demand.
7. Big brother strengthens the law: governments increase
mass surveillance instead of making laws to strengthen
security
As a consequence of the Snowden revelations, some expected
governments to restore (part of) the privacy of individual users.
However, the reverse seems to be the case. While parliaments in the
EU and in the US have held hearings to learn more about the practices
of intelligence agencies and have many options to improve privacy,
little progress has been made in imposing privacy controls. Despite
this, governments in a number of European countries have even
strengthened laws to increase mass surveillance. This increase in
surveillance entail a commensurate threat to the security, privacy and
user's trust levels.
After the invalidation of the Data Retention Directive (2006/24/EC)
by the European Court of Justice in 2014 and the European
Commission's statement that it is “neither opposing, nor advocating
the introduction of national data retention laws”, many European
countries have and practice data retention laws that establish retention
periods ranging between 6 and 24 months for connection and metadata
[25]. Some of the most criticised national regulations, which were
brought to the table in the aftermath of the 2015 terrorist attacks in
Paris and capitalized on the then reigning climate of scare and fear in
the population, are those of the UK, France, the Netherlands and
Germany. In the case of the UK, the draft communications bill known
as “snoopers charter”, required telecom and Internet service providers
to keep records of customers' browsing activity, social media use,
emails, voice calls, online gaming and text messages for 12 months.
The French Council – in spite of warnings from the UN Committee for
Human Rights about the excessively broad and very intrusive surveil-
lance it would enable – approved a law that allows intelligence agencies
to monitor phone calls and emails without prior judicial authorisation
in July 2015. This law requires Internet service providers to ﬁlter all
Internet traﬃc and enables metadata analysis for identifying suspicious
behaviour.
Advocates of mass surveillance have often used the terrorist threat
as an excuse for mass surveillance. Although mass surveillance has
been in use for many years now, it has not been able to stop recent
terrorist attacks in Tunisia, Egypt and Paris. The NSA has published
ﬁgures on how many attacks have been thwarted [26] and US oﬃcials
claim that “the information gathered from these programs provided
the U.S. government with critical leads to help prevent over 50
potential terrorist events in more than 20 countries around the
world.”8 However, it is not possible to verify the accuracy of these
ﬁgures [27].
One of the ways to solve the problem of providing lawful intercep-
tion capabilities evolves around the idea of public (controlled) agents
(footnote continued)
7 Schrems vs. Data Protection oﬃcer, C-362/14.
8 Gen. Keith B. Alexander, former Director of the NSA, in a hearing before the U.S.
House of Representatives Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence.
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that escrow master- or partial keys that would allow deciphering
encrypted data. Key escrow and recovery agents are two conceptual
implementations of this idea which have recently started being re-
introduced in the discussion by diﬀerent government and LEA
representatives. While key escrow refers to the case in which a trustee
holds a key for each user, a recovery agent will hold a master key that
could decipher data of all users of a speciﬁc encryption algorithm.
The US government pushed for a key escrow system in the 1990s in
order to allow LEA to have the ability to decrypt encrypted information,
provided they had the necessary court order. However, the tech
community and companies were not comfortable with the government
having this ability, since they were not convinced of its trustworthiness
for administering such universal pass-keys and because there were
technical problems with the proposed mechanism at the time [28].
In the eyes of many security professionals, the use of key-recovery-
based encryption infrastructures to meet law enforcement's stated
speciﬁcations, undermines the security of encryption as a whole and
increases costs to the end-user. Building a secure governance infra-
structure for such an approach would be extremely complex. Even if it
could be built, its risks and costs would eventually render it unaccep-
table. In addition, these infrastructures would generally require extra-
ordinary levels of trust that cannot be easily transferred. Both back-
ward and forward security could not be guaranteed by key escrow or
key recovery mechanisms, since the possession of master keys, be they
restricted to individuals or of generic purpose, enables the decryption
of all past and future messages that have been encrypted with the
corresponding public keys. Even if a current government would comply
with the required trust-level, a subsequent government could shame-
lessly violate this trustworthiness.
For these reasons neither key escrow, nor key recovery agents can
be considered valid and feasible solutions to the problem of guarantee-
ing LEA access to encrypted evidence.
Governments seem to hold on to the now ancient adage get what
you can lay your hands on. The reasoning seems to follow classic
tragedy-of-the-commons thinking: the incentive for monitoring, re-
taining metadata and indiscriminate mass surveillance is supposed to
be a higher level of (national) security, but at the same time these
practices are eroding the security (and privacy) of electronic commu-
nications. The attempts of some governments to introduce backdoors
in encryption standards are the most prominent and obvious examples
of this dilemma. Legislators and security agencies must understand
that weakening the security of electronic communications will have a
major negative impact on the digital economy, since all online
transactions rely on adequate security (i.e. encryption) mechanisms.
8. Conclusions
This article has presented several ways to improve security in
electronic communications. The years since 2013 have shown an
increasing willingness on the part of companies to implement more
secure encryption. However, governments seem reluctant to give up
their acquired data sources to re-establish the state of law.
In a general sense, the Internet represents a classic ‘tragedy of the
commons’. Commons are goods that beneﬁt all, regardless of how they
are governed or created. They diﬀer from public goods in the sense that
they are a social system [29]. The idea of ‘knowledge commons’ has
been increasingly in vogue. The concept of the tragedy of the commons
is based on the idea that rationally acting individuals will deplete a
common resource. This idea seems inspiring with regards to the
Internet in its current form: the idea of securing the Internet by
building back doors will inevitably lead to the demise of the Internet as
a place for a secure and private exchange of ideas with peers.
Improving security on the Internet is done in the interplay between
several parties: governments, industry and the public. Governments
can take positions by implementing regulation on security. The
implementation of baselines with regards to the security and privacy
are still in their infancy. They can also stimulate better understanding
by the general public by investing in education. Perhaps most
importantly, they can nudge markets towards desired behaviour by
deﬁning a basic security level and using secure devices and applications
themselves, as well as ﬁnancing essential non-proﬁt, open-source
applications that beneﬁt all users.
The industry has already been working on implementing more
security, by increasing the use of encryption in commonly used
applications. However, a lot can still be achieved by improving the
user-friendliness of secure technology. The costs for integrating
security-by -design principles can be steep at ﬁrst, but they pay
dividends when implementing. Patching afterwards can be minimized,
as can the damage done to the image of the companies involved in
potential breaches. The growth of privacy as a business enabler is
beginning to take up speed.
The public has the obvious role of demanding security and privacy
enhancing technology to be implemented. Secure e-mail, secure
messaging and secure phone calls should be the current basic demand
of consumers of electronic products. In the future this demand should
extend to secure communications with IoT devices that will invade all
aspects of human life.
Finally, the deployment of PETs and encryption more speciﬁcally
should not prevent LEA from conducting targeted investigations
pending the delivery of proper warrants by judicial authorities. LEA
should have the skills and technical means for targeted interception of
data at the end-point level before/after it is encrypted/decrypted (as
opposed to indiscriminate bulk data collection for the purpose of
signals intelligence), if necessary by conducting physical interventions
on the devices of the data subject under investigation [30]. If major
security vulnerabilities are identiﬁed and exploited by LEA during
targeted investigations, LEA should report them to the vendors/service
providers concerned as soon as a possible, without compromising the
results of on-going investigations.
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